Among his achievements, in the Chinese language version, was that he had turned the South China Sea Arbitration at The Hague - which found against China - into "waste paper".

It was an achievement that state news agency Xinhua's lengthy hymn, entitled "Xi and His Era", did not include in the English version for foreign consumption.

In the past month, Xi first asserted his unchallenged authority within the Communist state at the five-yearly Chinese national Congress, having his "Xi Jinping Thought: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" written into the country's constitution.

Then he pulled off a diplomatic win, placating ASEAN countries over China's military presence in disputed South China Sea waters, while avoiding a direct rebuke from visiting US President Donald Trump.

In the wake of these successes, the messaging to a nationalistic domestic audience had a triumphant tone.

Xi was said to have an affinity with the People's Liberation Army, which he has strengthened as commander in chief. He has a photo of himself in military uniform on his desk. According to Xi: "The only one who can prevent war is the one ready for war."

As Australia resets its foreign policy in a white paper to be released this week, these issues will be front of mind: what are China's ambitions on the global stage and how will that reshape the world order?

A more strident tone

It is early days in Xi Jinping's "new era", but its shape, within China's domestic politics at least, is emerging.

The Congress set the tone for a more strident emphasis on the Communist Party: China would not follow the western path, and was now prepared to offer a new economic model to developing countries.

Party officials were warned not to believe in "sorcery", gods or western-style separation of powers and multi-party systems, as if the three were equivalent.

The elevation of theorist Wang Huning, Xi's speechwriter, to the Politburo Standing Committee last month, sent China watchers scrambling to read his early essays, which described a Chinese neo-authoritarianism.

Wang insisted western democracy could not be grafted onto Chinese politics, at least partly because of the habit of far-flung provinces to do as they will and the explosion of local corruption after Deng Xiaoping's "get rich" push.

Chinese reform had to be led by the party to maintain stability.

Wang now guides China's propaganda work, crafting the image of powerful leader, Xi.

For western observers, the most palatable example of this authoritarianism at work is the quick-time environmental progress of the world's biggest coal user.

China is on track to meet its Paris Agreement goals, it revealed at the Bonn climate change conference, and the country's envoy reported the world's biggest national carbon trading scheme would begin this year.

Environment groups believe China will exceed these goals, and its carbon emissions would peak earlier than 2030.

Unencumbered by climate change denialists and domestic political scraps, China's environment inspection teams just get on with the job ??? punishing a thousand local officials who failed to the get Xi's green message and shutting carbon belching factories, even if it slows economic growth.

Policy leadership?

On the international scene, the question remains whether China's rise will take on a global policy leadership role, or content itself with economic matters.

Xi said during the 19th Congress last month that China would take an active role as "constructor of global peace, a contributor to development of global governance and a protector of international order".

Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at ANU, says it's wrong to assume that China's rise is only about its economy.

"One thing Xi Jinping has to do to legitimise the Chinese Communist Party is not just keep the economy growing, but assert its place in the world," he says.

The Chinese people are "a lot like the rest of us - they really care about their country", says White, and patriots in China see the old world order as embedding the subordination of China to the US. China wants "equalisation".

"Nothing Trump has done has contested China's claim to a bigger leadership role in Asia."

White says that, while Trump is president, the US will be unable to recover its position of influence in Asia.

Most Asian countries would prefer the US to stick around, because they don't want to live under China's shadow, says White. But they unwilling to give up valuable relationships with China.

White predicts Australia's foreign policy white paper will say China has become big and important and is throwing its weight around, but Australia needn't worry because the US provides regional security. However, in a Quarterly Essay to be published next week, White argues Australia's assumption about US power deterring China is wrong.

Pluralism and rules

Robert Daly, director of the Wilson Centre's Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, questioned whether China truly wants global leadership, which requires upholding pluralism and international rules.

He said Xi had only spoken of economic globalisation.

Daly argues in the next five years, China will be preoccupied with domestic challenges of rebalancing its economic development. China may focus on gradual advances in regional influence, but won't accelerate its "military intimidation and chequebook diplomacy" unless provoked.

Chinese soft power, meanwhile, fails abroad because its authoritarian messaging "repulses foreign audiences".

China is crippled in the international arena by the ideology the party feels it needs to maintain power at home.

That said, he agreed that, "the era of uncontested American leadership has ended". And after watching Trump's tour of Beijing and Vietnam, every American with a TV set knows it.