Ben Mackiewicz - pilot
Subscribe now for unlimited access.
$0/
(min cost $0)
or signup to continue reading
Ben Mackiewicz was born on 15 June, 1978. He grew up in country Victoria.
Mr Mackiewicz commenced flying training in February 1996 with Mr Malcolm Sharp, the managing director and chief pilot of Sharp Aviation based in Hamilton, Victoria.
He obtained his commercial pilot's licence in November 1996 and a Grade 3 Instructor's rating in December 1996.
He was employed by Sharp Aviation between June and August 1997 as an instructor, and charter and ferry pilot.
He then worked as an instructor in regional New South Wales and eventually commenced employment with Whyalla Airlines in early January 1999.
The ATSB final report, Exhibit C97, outlines the Whyalla Airlines induction program contained in their Operations Manual (Exhibit C73h). This included training in procedures following an engine failure during cruise, emergency evacuation, ditching, survival methods on land or water, passenger control during emergencies, night flight, together with practical exercises in single engine flying, single engine approach and landing, feathering and unfeathering of propellers, and other techniques.
Exhibit C97 records that Mr Mackiewicz completed this program on 21 January, 1999.
The records also outline that Mr Mackiewicz completed a Command Instrument Rating flight test, including single engine handling, on 26 July, 1999, and also successfully completed a proficiency check on 5 January, 2000.
At the time of the accident on 31 May, 2000, Mr Mackiewicz and Mr Kuch, who joined the company in February 1999, were the two most senior line pilots at Whyalla Airlines.
Most of the line pilots at Whyalla Airlines at the time, with the exception of Mr Kym Brougham, were relatively inexperienced and in the early stages of their careers as commercial pilots.
All of the witnesses who gave evidence at the inquiry, and others who have given statements, have described Mr Mackiewicz as a competent, professional and unflappable pilot.
For example, Mr Sharp said that, after his training, Mr Mackiewicz was employed in the company and indeed he was put in charge of the Warrnambool operation of the company.
This position required someone of higher ability and higher personal skills to handle that business, and "we saw fit to put him into that position".
I received extensive evidence about Mr Mackiewicz's competence and professionalism, all of it positive.
In particular, I heard comments that he was competent in handling emergencies, and generally complimentary descriptions of his airmanship were given.
Several experts commented that having regard to the difficulties he faced, Mr Mackiewicz performed extremely well in relation to the manner in which he controlled the aircraft prior to the ditching.
Mr McIlwaine SC, counsel for the ATSB, raised one issue concerning Mr Mackiewicz's training. Mr McIlwaine SC argued that the training records indicated that Mr Mackiewicz had a weakness in his use of the rudder during a simulated engine failure. For example, following a check in January 1999, Mr Brougham noted that Mr Mackiewicz was inclined to "overcontrolling rudder". Elsewhere on the document Mr Brougham made the notation:
"Excessive overcontrolling of rudder in both correct and incorrect sense, severity increasing as stress builds up while trying to adjust to evertightening steep turn onto final."
Mr McIlwaine SC seized upon these comments as an important issue in relation to Mr Mackiewicz's handling of MZK during its final journey on 31 May, 2000. In particular, he argued that such a weakness may have been important in understanding what happened at 1847:15 when the aircraft diverged 19 to the right.
This topic attracted a considerable degree of attention from all parties at the inquest. I will discuss the issue in more detail later.
Apart from that single issue, all the evidence before me suggests that Mr Mackiewicz was a competent and professional pilot.
His training and experience were quite conventional for a pilot working in that industry with that degree of experience, and there is no suggestion that there was any deficiency which was relevant to the events of 31 May, 2000.
One indicator of his performance under stress was the events of 7 January, 2000 (which I will discuss in detail later), and there was nothing in relation to that incident which gave cause for concern.
Issues, discussion and conclusions
Was Mr Mackiewicz appropriately trained, qualified and experienced when he piloted MZK on Flight 904 on 31 May, 2000?
The evidence before me establishes that Mr Mackiewicz was appropriately trained and qualified to act as a pilot in regular passenger transport (RPT) operations according to all criteria set down by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
He completed Whyalla Airlines' induction program on 21 January, 1999, received Command Instrument Rating on 26 July, 1999, and underwent a proficiency check on 5 January, 2000.
Although it was early in his career, Mr Mackiewicz and Mr Tim Kuch were the two most senior line pilots at Whyalla Airlines.
Were Mr Mackiewicz's character and personal qualities, as well as his training and experience, such that he was likely to have responded appropriately to an extreme emergency situation such as the one which he confronted on 31 May, 2000?
The evidence before me establishes that Mr Mackiewicz was a professional pilot who was competent in handling emergencies.
Having regard to the particularly adverse conditions on the night of 31 May, 2000, expert opinion is unanimous that he handled the emergency well, and that he ditched the aircraft as well as could have been expected in the circumstances.
Is the calmness and professionalism evident in Mr Mackiewicz's voice during the radio transmissions after the Mayday call consistent with the allegations of the ATSB that, having regard to his experience in January 2000, the resultant stress caused him to make a serious error in the management of the right engine?
There was no evidence before me that Mr Mackiewicz found the incident in January 2000, when he completed a forced landing on one engine at Maitland, South Australia, particularly stressful. The only evidence of distress Mr Mackiewicz may have suffered as a result of that incident was in relation to Mr Kym Brougham's reaction to the incident afterwards.
The calmness and professionalism evident in Mr Mackiewicz's voice during radio transmissions on 31 May, 2000, suggest that he was still in control and had not panicked or otherwise acted inappropriately.
Mr Cavenagh, the senior transport investigator in charge of the ATSB investigation, argued that Mr Mackiewicz may have mismanaged the right engine as a result of the "terrifying" situation he found himself in. He said:
"Then it's in our view that it is entirely reasonable to understand the pilot as soon as the left engine failed, to firewalling the other engine to ensure that he maximises his survivability chances.
"It's bad enough with something like this happening during the day, but for it to happen at night would be pretty terrifying." (T3544)
The ATSB commissioned an analysis of these radio transmissions by Dr Maurice Nevile of the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. Dr Nevile's report is part of Mr Cavenagh's evidence, Exhibit C213. Dr Nevile is described as an applied linguist and interaction analyst, whose PhD research involved language and interaction in airline cockpits.
Dr Nevile found nothing unusual or significant in the Mayday transmission or subsequent transmissions (p14). He had been asked by the ATSB "whether there is anything that could be considered consistent with a change in workload, attentional focus, stress, anxiety or similar mental state". He found no such evidence.
The radio transmissions were also analysed by Ms Jennifer Elliott who is described as a consultant in Forensic Speech Analysis. Ms Elliott concluded that she found no sign of "change of workload, attentional focus, stress, anxiety or similar mental state" until the transmission immediately before the Mayday call, after which she found "intermittent" signs of those conditions which, she said, "one would expect after finding oneself in the situation that the pilot communicated to ATC in his Mayday call" (p14).
On the basis of this evidence, there is nothing to justify the ATSB conclusion that MZK had suffered a catastrophic failure of the left engine at 1847:15, about 14 minutes earlier, and that, as a result of such a "change of workload, attentional focus, stress" etc, Mr Mackiewicz inadvertently overboosted the right engine thereby damaging it.